It was a bloody year for Turkey. Over 1,000 people - civilians and soldiers - were killed around the country after terrorist acts carried out by the PKK (the Kurdistan Workers' Party). It was also a very frustrating year for the Turkish army, which was the target of a great deal of criticism for its inability to "destroy the terrorist infrastructure" of the Kurds. Turkey bombed villages in Iraq – where there are suspected PKK bases; it is also conducting exhausting negotiations with Iran about cooperation in the war against the Kurds; and is afraid of the moment when the Kurds in Syria declare an independent district in the northeast of the country, in the region bordering Turkey and Iraq.
Like many other countries fighting against terror organizations, Turkey has reached the conclusion that there's no escaping negotiations with the organization's leadership, in order to achieve - at the very least - a long-term cease-fire.
"You can't achieve results and destroy an organization by military means alone," Yalcin Akdogan, chief adviser to Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, admitted last week. Two days earlier, Erdogan himself declared that Turkey was conducting negotiations with Abdullah Ocalan, the leader of the PKK, who was arrested in 1999 and has subsequently been imprisoned in Imrali Prison near Istanbul, after his punishment was commuted from death to life imprisonment.
Ocalan is not its commander in the field, but as the founder of the organization – the PKK was founded in 1980, and four years later began to initiate a guerrilla war – he is considered its "spiritual" leader. At the same time, it's not clear to what extent he can influence the decisions of commanders in the field, who operate from inside Iraq. Like Hamas or Fatah in their day, the PKK has for years been suffering from a split between its external and internal leadership, which makes it difficult to conduct effective negotiations.
The decision to conduct negotiations is not a new one. Three years ago, Turkish intelligence tried to reach understandings with Ocalan. But in 2010, Ocalan - who spends his time in prison writing books - decided to quit the negotiations, claiming that the Turks did not treat his proposal seriously. Shortly afterward, Turkey began an all-out attack on PKK bases, arresting hundreds of activists and inflicting heavy losses. Apparently, though, negotiations were nevertheless being conducted alongside the attacks.
In September 2011, Turkey was in uproar after a recording was posted online in which the head of Turkish intelligence, Hakan Fidan, was heard conducting negotiations with senior PKK representatives in Oslo. At the time there were those who demanded that Fidan be charged with conducting contacts with a terror organization. Erdogan's intervention was necessary in order to remove the threat of indictment.
Now Turkey is once again trying to examine the chances of dialogue with Ocalan. His conditions and demands are not known, but, according to reports from Turkish sources, the government is willing to offer a pardon to those who hand over their weapons and allow them to emigrate from the country voluntarily. Australia is one of the countries of refuge being offered
"The contacts are continuing, because we must achieve results. As long as we see a potential for achieving a result, we will continue with them," Erdogan said in a newspaper interview last week. Suddenly negotiations with a terror organization have become legitimate in a country that has traditionally declared that it will fight the PKK to the finish, and will not conduct any negotiations with it.
The need for a cease-fire has become pressing, in light of the new strategic relationship that Turkey is developing with both the Kurdish region in Iraq and the Kurdish leadership headed by Massoud Barzani. Although Barzani agreed to help in the war against the PKK, Turkey is finding it more difficult than previously to pressure him to act with determination, after he became a strategic partner.
The crisis in relations between Turkey and Iraq has turned the Kurdish leadership into an ally. This comes after Turkey provided a refuge for Iraqi vice president Tariq al-Hashimi - wanted in Iraq on suspicion of involvement in terror - in addition to the assistance Iraq is providing to the regime of Syrian President Bashar Assad and the major Turkish investments in the Kurdish region. But this alliance has a price.
Barzani, who is actively assisting the Kurds in Syria and allowing the Syrian Kurdish rebel forces to train and arm themselves in his territory, does not want to be seen as opposing the Kurdish "freedom fighters" operating against Turkey. He prefers to have Turkey reach an agreement with the PKK and them to stop pressuring him to become a collaborator.
The political pressure on Erdogan inside Turkey is also increasing. Elections for the local authorities will be held this year. As in past years, they will indicate the popularity of the Justice and Development Party, and establish or undermine the basis of support in advance of the presidential election to be held next year. A solution to the "Kurdish problem" is therefore likely to have a strong political influence on Erdogan's chances of being elected president.
That's how the tables have turned: When the route that connects Imrali Prison and the Qandil Mountains in northern Iraq - where the PKK has established itself - is also the route likely to lead Erdogan from the prime minister's residence to the presidential palace.









